Temporary contracts can be used by employers to screen potential new employees. The empirical literature has shown that temporary contracts can serve as stepping stones into permanent employment for workers. For both reasons we expect that workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide extra effort compared to permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss Labor Force Survey we confirm this effect, show its heterogeneity across different types of temporary contracts, and investigate differences between men and women.
Introduction
Contract based incentives are of key interest not only for behavioral sciences such as personnel economics, but also for active human resources management. 1 An important characteristic of employment contracts is whether they are permanent or temporary. Since temporary employment as a share of total employment recently has risen in a number of countries it has garnered increased scientific attention (cf. OECD 2002 , Booth et al. 2002a ). However, researchers mostly address questions relating either (i) to the macroeconomic impact of temporary employment on unemployment and labor turnover, 2 or (ii) to differences of job (wage, training, satisfaction) and worker characteristics in permanent versus temporary contracts. 3 This appears to be the first study to raise the question of whether there are measurable behavioral responses connected to holding permanent versus temporary employment contracts. The incentive s behind these responses derive from the character of temporary jobs as stepping stones to generally preferable permanent jobs, a role that is confirmed in empirical studies:
4 If temporary employment can offer access to desirable permanent contracts, emplo yees on temporary contracts have an incentive to display high levels of effort.
The issue of behavioral responses to temporary contracts is related to an empirical literature which confirms contract based incentives in a variety of other areas. The studies look at effort responses to probation and employment protection (e.g. Ichino and Riphahn 2002, Riphahn and Thalmaier 2001) , analyze the response of absenteeism to alternative regulations of sickleave (e.g. Barmby et al. 1991) , and describe opportunistic responses to monitoring intensity (e.g. Nagin et al. 2002) .
Using data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) we compare the behavior of individuals in permanent and temporary contracts. The SLFS survey -a rotating panelcontains information on workers' current contract as well as on effort indicators such as absenteeism and unpaid overtime work. We investigate the overall evidence for incentive effects of temporary contracts as well as their heterogeneity by comparing outcomes across effort indicators and worker groups.
This study adds to the literature in several regards. First, it continues the micro-level analysis of temporary contracts initiated by Booth et al. (2002b) . That study examined whether temporary contracts deserve to be considered as "stepping stones." The authors confirm for the case of the United Kingdom that large shares of workers in temporary contracts afterwards move on to permanent contracts with higher wages and fringe benefits. They also show that high effort among temporary workers is positively correlated with the probability of career advancement.
Second, we provide empirical evidence of the extent of contract related incentive effects, an issue neglected in prior discussions. We carefully describe the effects of different types of temporary employment to clarify that there are important heterogeneities within this set of contracts. Finally, we present evidence for the interesting case of Switzerland, a country similar to the United Kingdom and the United States in that e mployment protection legislation is limited, and a country about which too little is known so far.
Our results confirm that workers respond to contract-related incentives, as individuals on temporary contracts are significantly more likely to provide unpaid overtime work. We investigate the relevance of adverse selection into temporary employment and describe the heterogeneity of our findings across different types of temporary employment.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the relevant literature and formulates the hypotheses which our empirical analysis will test. Section 3 describes the data and empirical strategy, and section 4 presents the results. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
Literature, Theoretical Background, and Hypotheses
Since the incentive effect of temporary contracts has not been investigated before, we first review related studies and then discuss our hypotheses. The effect of contract based incentives on employee behavior has been addressed in an empirical literature on the role of employment protection as well as in research on sick-pay related moral hazard.
The studies evaluating the incentive effects of employment protection utilize institutional regulations to identify the relevant effects. Ichino and Riphahn (2001) find strong increases in absenteeism among Italian bank employees when probation periods end and employment protection sets in. Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001) confirm similar absenteeism responses to the end of probationary contracts among German employees. Jimeno and Cortes (1996) investigate the effect of low employment protection in Spanish temporary employment on absenteeism. Again the authors find that not having employment protection causes workers to provide significantly higher levels of effort compared to workers in secure permanent contracts.
The hypothesis that sick-pay may provide incentives for opportunistic behavior has been confirmed in a broader literature. Barmby et al. (1991) show that regulations assigning sickpay in an exp erience-rated system yield clear employee responses: The duration of absences varies depending on the sick days allowed under an individual's current absence rating. Johansson and Palme (1996,2002) describe that absenteeism declined among Swedish men following a reduction of sick-pay. Barmby (2002) finds that workers reduce absences when the difference between sick-pay and earnings is high.
Similar to probationary periods, employment protection legislation, and sick-pay provisions the duration of workers' employment contract may generate effort responses. Thus a comparison of the effort levels of workers on temporary and permanent contracts provides an opportunity to test for and quantify possible moral hazard behavior among permanent employees.
Assuming that temporary employment contracts are less attractive than permanent ones 5 temporary workers have an incentive to provide high levels of effort: First, because it is known that firms tend to use temporary employment to screen potential permanent employees prior to committing to a binding contract. So if temporary workers want to obtain a permanent employment contract they need to pass this employer screening.
Second, there is considerable direct evidence that temporary contracts serve as stepping stones into more attractive employment contracts -also with other than the current employer. Booth et al. (2002b) confirm for the United Kingdom that about 38 percent of all workers on fixedterm contracts move on to permanent employment after the fixed-term contract expires. Interestingly, the authors confirm a positive correlation between a worker's effort as measured by the number of unpaid hours of overtime work, and the probability of moving on to a permanent contract.
However, these incentive mechanisms m ay not characterize all temporary contracts in the same way. First, there exists a variety of temporary contracts. Booth et al. (2002b) distinguish jobs which are temporary by nature ("seasonal and casual employment") from those which could just as well be filled by permanent employees ("fixed term contracts"). Employees in these contracts differ significantly in their transition rates to permanent employment, in the long run wage effects of past temporary employment spells, as well as in wages and job satisfaction.
Also, Sanchez and Toharia (2000) discuss productivity losses due to reduced investments in the specific human capital of temporary employees and because permanent employees may cooperate less with temporary workers if they expect that their contracts will not be renewed. They point out that the effort of temporary workers may fall below that of permanent workers, when there is no opportunity for prolonged employment. So a number of arguments suggest that heterogeneity and countervailing mechanisms may obfuscate the above suggested incentives for increased employee effort.
Another interesting issue concerns the difference between male and female temporary workers. Booth et al. (2002b) argue that women may seek temporary employment because this matches their high propensity to move on to non-market employment. Therefore women may more frequently and voluntarily self-select in non-screening temporary employment than men. For their response to screening incentives this suggests that women in temporary employment ceteris paribus may provide less effort than men, as men are more likely to seek career advancement.
Additional aspects may affect behavioral differences between the sexes: Discrimination might influence the selection of individuals into f ixed term versus permanent jobs. If for given ability men are more likely to find permanent employment, then on average women in temporary employment should be of higher ability. If high ability is correlated with a career orientation then these high ability women may respond to incentives and provide additional effort. In this case women in temporary employment ceteris paribus may provide more effort than men.
However, the conclusion that the experience of discrimination results in the subsequent provisio n of high levels of effort may not be convincing: If high ability has not been rewarded in the past high effort may be in vein as well.
So far we discussed three gender-specific mechanisms, which we label the housewife effect, the resilience effect and the frustration effect where the first and the last should cause lower and the second higher effort among women compared to men. Below we investigate the empirical evidence in this question.
Overall our empirical analysis seeks to test the following hypotheses:
H1: Workers in temporary employment provide more effort compared to workers in permanent contracts.
H2:
The effort response of temporary workers to the incentives inherent in temporary employment contracts varies, because of the heterogeneity in the incentive itself: Seasonal and casual workers may not be subject to the same level of ability screening as substitute workers on jobs that might become permanent. We expect heterogeneity in effort response by type of temporary contract.
H3:
Heteroge neity in incentives is correlated with worker characteristics as e.g. individuals with low levels of education are more likely to be employed in seasonal and casual temporary work with no screening than workers with higher education. The differentiation by worker ability and worker education is particularly plausible if we assume that "ability signals" are less clear for the well educated yielding a higher need for screening.
H4: We hypothesize that males and females differ in their response to temporary employment incentives.
The next section describes data and variables used in our analysis.
Data and Empirical Strategy

Dataset and Sample
The data for our analysis are taken from six annual waves (1996 -2001) of the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS). The SLFS is a telephone survey among randomly chosen individuals aged 15 and above. It does not cover foreign workers without a permanent residence permit. The typical annual survey samples 16-18,000 households. The SLFS is a rotating panel where every individual is interviewed up to five times. The questionnaires cover sociodemographic indicators, information on an employee's type of contract, employment and effort.
Pooling the observations from six annual surveys yields 103,005 observations. We restrict our sample to non-self-employed individuals 6 in full-time employment, who are not in an apprenticeship or in military service. We drop individuals of retirement age (men above age 65, women above 63) and a few observations with missing values on key variables. In the end our sample covers 33,945 person-year observations, representing about 10,497 different male and 5,411 different female workers, with on average 2.1 annual observations per person.
Key Dependent and Explanatory Variables
We consider two effort indicators as dependent variables, which are established in this literature: The first is an indicator for whether the worker provided unpaid overtime hours.
Respondents are asked whether it happens frequently or at least sometimes that they have to work longer hours than spelled out in their contract. If they agree a subsequent question is whether this is typically remunerated financially, in leisure or not at all. Those indicating that overtime work is typically not remunerated provide u npaid overtime work. Our second indicator describes whether a person missed work in the week prior to the survey due to illness, accident, personal or family matters, or "other" reasons. 7 Both measures are coded as binary variables.
The key explanatory variable indicates whether the individual works on a temporary contract. 4.4 percent of all employees in our sample are temporarily employed. This figure differs from the about ten percent share presented by OECD (2002) for Switzerland; the difference is most likely due to the different selection of the sample.
8 Based on the sampling rules applied by OECD (2002) Switzerland's temporary employment share is at the OECD average. While some countries experienced severe fluctuations in the share of their temporary employment over time, the Swiss figure remained quite stable during the six years of our data between a maximum value of 4.9 percent in 1996 and the lowest value of 3.7 percent in 2000.
Based on the SLFS information on the type of temporary contract we distinguish four contract types and coded a fifth describing observations with missing contract "type" information. The four contract types describe (i) seasonal and casual employment, (ii) public sector sponsored employment programs, (iii) internships, and (iv) "advanced temporary contracts" such as for temporary substitute workers, fixed term project work, probationary employment, temporary employment agency workers, and "other" temporary contracts. Public sector sponsored programs are designed to reintegrate previously unemployed workers in the labor market. Internships are temporary contracts with typically low or no pay, where the intern intends to learn about the workings of a company or agency. We expect that the incentive to provide effort is highest among those with the highest probability of company screening, i.e. categories (iv) and (iii), and we expect the least incentives among groups (ii) and (i) where workers are either unlikely to reapply for employment or where promotions are not possible. 6 The group of self-employed individuals in the SLFS contains the self-employed, employed workers who own their business, as well as individuals working in family businesses.
7 Similar indicators were used by Booth et al. (2002b) in the case of overtime and Jimeno and Cortes (1996) for absences.
8 OECD (2002, Chart 3.1) reports that more than 10 percent of the Swiss labor force is temporarily employed. However this includes part-time workers and apprentices. There does not seem to be an age restriction and the large group of "self-employed" workers seem to be included, too. Table 1 presents the characteristics of individuals employed in permanent and temporary contracts. It yields differences in a variety of dimensions: As one might expect, temporary work is more frequent among the young, among females, and foreign workers. The educational patterns are nonlinear in that temporary workers are more likely to be in the lowest and the highest educational categories compared to those employed permanently. The share of married individuals is higher among those with permanent contracts than among the temporarily employed. While the distribution of workers across firm size categories does not seem to differ by contract type, temporary workers are much more likely to be employed in certain industries (e.g. public sector administration, t eaching, health) and occupations than permanent employees. Not surprisingly the latter also have much longer tenure.
Given that permanent and temporary contracts differ on a number of dimensions it is informative and interesting to describe the effort ind icators by contract type. Table 2 presents this information for the full sample and by sex. The first row in Panel A indicates that 20.6 percent of all those employed on permanent contracts and 27.7 of those on temporary contracts indicated to have worked unpaid overtime. The first row in Panel B shows that the absence share among those in permanent contracts exceeds that among workers on temporary contracts by about 50 percent. Thus the aggregate measures agree with our expectation of higher effort among t emporary compared to permanent employees. These differences are similarly observed when we evaluate the evidence by sex, where generally men appear to provide higher levels of effort than women.
The last five columns of Table 2 describe mean effort by type of temporary employment contract. For both, Panel A and Panel B, we find the highest effort levels and lowest absence rates among those in contract categories (iii) and (iv). The high effort levels of workers in the last column of Table 2 with missing c ontract type information are surprising, but can unfortunately not be interpreted. Also when disaggregating by sex we find the lowest effort levels among those in public programs. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the analyses below, separately by sex of the worker.
Empirical Strategy
The purpose of our analysis is to test the hypotheses derived in section 2. Hypothesis 1 (H1) claims that workers in temporary contracts provide more effort than those permanently employed. This is tested as step 1 of the analysis by regressing our effort outcomes on an indicator of temporary employment in random effect probit models. To ensure that the measured outcomes are not due to composition effects, the model considers control variables describing either the individual worker (age, sex, marital status, nationality, health, level of education), the job (tenure, firm size, industry, occupation), or survey year effects. We provide the results of random effects probit estimates where the control for unobserved heterogeneity improved the model and standard probit results otherwise.
In steps 2 and 3 of the analysis we test hypotheses 2 (H2) and 3 (H3). In H2 we stated that overtime and absence responses of temporary workers sho uld vary by type of contract. We expect higher effort responses for interns and those on advanced temporary contracts. This is formally tested by substituting a set of type of contract indicators for the overall indicator of temporary employment in the models for overtime work and absence.
Similarly, H3 suggests that incentives to provide effort vary by worker ability. These variations can be investigated by controlling for the level of education specific effects of temporary employment: We reestimate the models of step 1 adding a set of education interactions to the overall temporary contract indicator.
The last step of the analysis investigates differences in responses to incentives by gender. We first add interactions between the temporary contract and female sex indicators and then discuss more refined estimation approaches. The results or our analysis are presented in section 4.
Results
The results of the "baseline" step 1 regressions for the overtime and absence indicators are presented in Table 4 . The random effects control significantly improved the model fit only in the overtime model. Therefore the random effect probit estimator is considered only in the former and a standard probit estimator is used for the absence model. Overall the regression results are robust to the choice of estimator, where we compared the outcomes of probit, logit, random effects probit estimators.
The temporary contract indicator yields the expected coefficient in the model for overtime work: Individuals on temporary jobs are significantly more likely to work unpaid overtime hours than individuals on permanent contracts. In fact, controlling for the other variables the difference in the predicted probabilities even exceeds that presented in Table 2 . The regression suggests that holding everything else constant the difference in the probability of overtime work under a temporary versus a permanent contract amounts to 55 percent of the baseline probability of overtime work (see bottom row and notes of Table 4 ).
The other results indicate that the propensity to work unpaid overtime increases significantly with age and education, it is higher for males, Swiss nationals, for married individuals, and for those free of grave health shocks.
9 Also, overtime work is correlated with tenure, firm size, occupation and industry. Joint coefficient tests yielded significant overall effects for the sets of age, tenure, firm size, occupation and industry indicators.
In contrast to the estimation of overtime work, the model for absences does not yield a statistically significant difference by contract status. While the negative coefficient indicates a lower absence probability for those on temporary contracts, the coefficient is insignificant. This finding is robust across specificatio ns and the chosen estimator, and remains unchanged when more detailed indicators and further interactions of the temporary work indicator are considered. 10 We conclude that temporary workers differ from permanently employed colleagues with 9 The measure for a health shock is available only for the 1998 -2001 surveys and describes whether a worker has experienced a health based work absence of more than half a year. 10 Given the very small share of absence events in the data the imprecise estimate may be due to the small number of observations in the temporary contract group. Since logit and probit models generate different results when there is an extreme split in the dependent variable, we estimated the models (also for the step 2-4 analyses) with logit estimators as well. The outcome of an insignificant difference between temporary and permanent contract workers is robust. respect to unpaid overtime work but not regarding absences. If the effect is robust in larger samples, this means that either temporary workers do not make a special effort to avoid absences or permanent workers miss work already at very low levels. By international comparison Swiss absenteeism rates are very low: Barmby et al. (2002) compare these rates for 9 European countries among which Swiss workers are least likely to miss work. The Swiss absence rate of 1.8 is far below the international average of 3.2. This suggests that in Switzerland absenteeism is not a dimension in which temporary workers can signal their motivation. We now focus our analysis on the overtime work indicator, for which hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected.
Step 2 of our analysis investigates the heterogeneity of the effort responses for the different types of temporary employment as described in section 3.2 and Table 2 above. The estimation results are presented in the first column of Table 5 . The categorical indicators of the type of contract are jointly significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficients confirm our expectations in that interns and workers on advanced temporary contracts are significantly more likely to provide extra work effort. The predicted effects indicate an increase in the probability of overtime work by 2.3 and 4.6 percentage points for interns and our group of "advanced" temporary workers, respectively. These are very sizeable effects given that the baseline probability of overtime work is as low as 6.5 percent. Even when controlling for covariates, workers on public programs are less likely to work overtime. Thus hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected, there is significant heterogeneity in the effort response of temporary workers.
We present the estimation results for the test of hypothesis 3 in the lower part of Table 5 . Again a random effects probit model was estimated, this time controlling for a set of education interactions in addition to the main temporary work indicator. As in Table 4 we find a sizeable positive overall correlation between working on a temporary contract and providing extra work effort. The effects of the interaction variables weakly confirm the hypothesis that high ability workers are likely to provide more effort than low ability individuals. We approximate high ability by the highest degree completed measured in five categories. These interaction terms are jointly statistically significant at the five percent level.
Finally, we investigate potential differences between the sexes as suggested by Hypothesis 4. The baseline model for unpaid overtime work, presented in Table 4 yielded a sizable significant negative coefficient for the indicator of female sex. Thus among all workers females provide less unpaid overtime work than men. We are interested here in the differences for temporary contracts in particular and reestimated the baseline model after adding an interaction term for temporary contract and female sex. The result, which is presented in Table 6 , yields an imprecisely estimated coefficient of small magnitude. Thus we find no significant overall difference between the sexes.
In section 3 we discussed alternative hypotheses regarding the differences in male-female effort responses to working on temporary contracts. If both the factors causing higher and lower effort are effective, the net effect might be that females do not differ from males. In order to investigate this possibility we estimated refined models with additional interaction terms.
In the last column of Table 6 we present the effect of interactions of the type of temporary contract and the female dummy. These coefficients are jointly significant at the ten percent level and show that the direction of the effort effect for the women runs counter to the effect estimated for men and thereby counter to hypothesis 2: Female interns are significantly less likely to provide unpaid overtime work compared to male interns. Female seasonal and casual workers are significantly more likely to work overtime compared to their male colleagues. This suggests that women respond less to the career related incentives compared to men.
A possible explanation and related factor may be that female workers accumulate less overtime in general because due to family obligations their time constraints are more binding than for men. We investigated whether this affects the effort responses to temporary work by controlling for interactions with marital status and even an indicator of whether there are children to care for in the household.
11 These estimations did not yield statistically significant results and we cannot reject the hypothesis that in our sample the family background of women has no effect on their response to incentives.
Adverse Selection into Temporary Contracts
A potentially important issue not addressed so far concerns the exogeneity of the temporary contract indicator itself. This problem is explicitly (Jimeno and Toharia Cortes 1996) or implicitly (Booth et al. 2002b ) ignored in prior studies. It is possible that those who end up in temporary employment are not a random draw from the population and that this selection affects the outcomes. However, given the detailed controls for human capital and job characteristics in our model it is unlikely that a selection based on observable characteristics causes a bias in our estimation.
However, the results may suffer a bias if unobservable factors determine the selection into temporary contracts and if these are correlated with our dependent variable. One might for example argue that those with low ability or work motivation fail to attain a permanent contract and end up in temporary employment. However, the evidence in Table 1 shows that workers in temporary contracts do not differ from permanently employed workers in such a clear and linear manner, rendering this rationale unlikely. If unmeasurable individual-specific characteristics cause selection into temporary employment, the panel nature of our data helps to control its impact via a random effect estimation.
We are confident that adverse selection is not a problem in our analysis because the heterogeneity of the considered temporary contracts -ranging from unemployed workers, to young interns, and a sizable share of university graduates -does not seem to leave room for systematic selection biases.
Conclusions
This study has analyzed the behavioral correlates of temporary versus fixed term contracts among Swiss workers based on six waves of data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey. The results suggest that temporary workers provide significantly more effort in terms of unpaid overtime work compared to employees with permanent contracts. Among those employed with time limited contracts we find different levels of effort depending on the type of contract. Confirming our expectations, those in positions with the potential for "upward mobility" are significantly more likely to work overtime.
Interestingly the effort response to incentives inherent in temporary employment could not be found for absences, an indicator typically applied in this literature. We interpret this result in combination with international evidence as indicative of a low overall level of employee 'moral hazard absences' in Switzerland. This might be related to the overall low level of employment protection in Switzerland. In consequence temporary employees may not be able to signal their characteristics to the employer by low absence rates.
A comparison between males and females yielded no significant differences in the overall responses to contract based incentives in Switzerland. There are weak indicators for a stronger response of males to contract based incentives when more refined empirical approaches are applied. The apparent similarity of the incentive response of both sexes is a finding which would be interesting to examine with different data and for other countries, as it differs from the existing evidence e.g. for the United Kingdom (Booth et al. 2002b ). Note: 1. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 2. The predicted effect of holding a temporary employment contract reflects the percent change in the probability of the outcome measure, when the temporary contract indicator is set to 1 versus 0. The probabilities are predicted at sample means and the difference in predicted probalities is related to the baseline probability. 3. The asterisks for the fixed effects controls indicate the joint significance of these measures. 4. Reference categories are agegroup 16-25, unmarried, swiss, no health problems, education none or basis, firmsize 1-11, tenure < 5 years, occupation 1, industry 1 and year 1996. Note: 1. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 2. In model (1) we controlled for the same set of regressors as in the spezifications in Table 4 . 3. In model (2) we controlled for the same set of regressors as in the spezifications in Table 5 .
